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Abstract 
This article questions a widespread understanding of collection and division as depicted in 
the Phaedrus. According to this understanding, these procedures are introduced in this 
dialogue as a new method for philosophical inquiry specific to Plato’s later conception of 
dialectic, the goal of which is definitions. The article argues that Plato rather presents these 
procedures as a foundation for thinking and speaking more generally and, when performed in 
a specific manner differing from the ordinary use, also for philosophical inquiry. It further 
argues that in consequence, the combined procedure of collection and division should not be 
regarded as identical with dialectical method as such, but rather as one among several 
procedures the dialectician may employ in philosophical inquiry. In order for such inquiry to 
result in definitions of the nature of what is marked off, it is finally argued, philosophical 
considerations external to, and in addition to, collection and division are called for.     
  
Introduction 
In the second half of the Phaedrus, while Socrates and Phaedrus are discussing how one 
should speak and write nobly or beautifully, Socrates makes the following statement:  
 
Now I am myself, Phaedrus, a lover of these divisions and collections, so that I may be 
able both to speak and think; and if I think anyone else has the capacity to look to one 
and over what are naturally many, I pursue him ‘in his footsteps, behind him, as if he 
were a god.’ And furthermore, those who can do this – whether I give them the right 
name or not, god knows, but at any rate – up till now I call them dialectical. (266b3-
c1).1  
 
1 Translations are from C. J. Rowe (trans. and comm.), Plato – Phaedrus, 2nd ed. [Phaedrus] 
(Oxford, 1988); they have been modified slightly at certain points without notice. The Greek 
text used is that of the OCT.   
 2 
 
This article will argue that Socrates here describes collection and division as procedures that 
underlie human speaking and thinking in general as well as philosophical inquiry, without 
identifying them with either. Establishing this thesis requires a detailed examination of 
Socrates’ description of these procedures; an interpretation of the role assigned to collection 
and division in Socrates’ speeches in the first part of the dialogue; and, finally, a discussion of 
the role the statement plays in the argument that unfolds between Socrates and Phaedrus in 
the passage 257b7 to 271c5.  
 The passage raises four questions the article undertakes to answer. First, 
Socrates’ claims that he has up until now been calling people ‘dialectical’ (dialektikous) who 
are able to “look to one and over what are naturally many” (I defend this translation in section 
II below), and that he loves collection and division because they enable him to speak and 
think. Does he thereby mean to suggest that the ability of the dialectician is identical with 
collection and division or does he rather distinguish between them?2 Second, we may wonder 
what collection and division are meant to provide: Are they meant to establish essential 
definitions or merely to help organize a subject matter of inquiry, or something related to it, in 
a systematic manner?3 Third, Socrates claims that he is a lover of collections and divisions in 
order (hina) that he may be able speak and think. Is he thereby suggesting that collections and 
divisions enable him to think and speak as a dialectician or rather that such procedure assists 
human beings in general to think and speak?4 Finally, Socrates claims that he has, up until 
 
2 See D. Henry, ‘A Sharp Eye for Kinds: Plato on Collection and Division’ [‘Sharp Eye’], Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 41 (2012), 229-55 for a recent discussion of this question. 
3 H. Fossheim, ‘Division as a Method in Plato’, in J. L. Fink (ed.), The Development of Dialectic 
from Plato to Aristotle (Cambridge, 2012), 91-112, argues for the second alternative, Henry, 
‘Sharp Eye’, argues for the first. See also M. L. Gill, ‘Division and Definition in Plato’s Sophist 
and Statesman’ in David Charles (ed.), Definition in Greek Philosophy (Oxford, 2010), 172-199. 
4 R. Hackforth (trans. and comm.), Plato’s Phaedrus [Phaedrus](Cambridge, 1952), note ad loc., 
suggests that Plato by “these words … is careful to keep before our minds the necessity of 
applying dialectic to rhetoric, ” thereby opting for the first alternative, while G. J. De Vries, A 
Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato [Commentary] (Amsterdam, 1969), ad loc., states, in 
opposition to Hackforth, that Plato is not merely thinking of this, but that his “intention is 
wider: the entire life of the mind depends on διαρέσεις and ξυναγωγαί.” The most recent 
commentary on the Phaedrus, H. Yunis, Plato: Phaedrus [Phaedrus](Cambridge, 2011), note ad 
loc., follows Hackforth and maintains that Socrates cannot mean “mere speaking and thinking, 
for which dialectic is hardly necessary,” but must be thinking of “speaking and thinking as a 
matter of τέχνη, whether ῥητορική or διαλεκτική.”  
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now (mechri toude), called those who are able to look to one and over what are naturally 
many “dialectical”. But how we should understand the qualification “up until now”? 
Considered from a dramatic perspective, the sentence clearly suggests that Socrates has, up 
until this point in his (fictional) life called the people he describes dialectical, and one seems 
entitled to infer that Plato is indicating that his Socrates in general, when using this word, 
points to people able to “look toward one and over what are naturally many”. Most scholars of 
the 20th century, however, have suggested that the statement should rather be read as the 
first announcement of Plato’s supposedly later conception of dialectic.5  
 While some of the questions raised by the passage are hotly debated, it is fair to 
say that something resembling a consensus regarding the way it should be read emerged 
during the 20th century. For it came to be a widely held view that Plato’s Socrates here 
introduces a new conception of inquiry, according to which collection and division are 
identical with dialectic, provide essential definitions of Forms (whether or not these Forms 
are conceived of as different from Forms as discussed in e.g. the Phaedo), and replace other 
methods for arriving at definitions known from Plato’s supposedly early and middle period 
dialogues.6 
 This article contends that these suppositions do not find support in the Phaedrus. 
It contends that Socrates is describing collection and division in a manner that suggests that 
they are both basic operations of human reasoning underlying thinking and speaking in 
general and procedures central to dialectical reasoning. What distinguishes the dialectical use 
of collection and division from their ordinary use, it will be argued, is that dialectic is 
committed to uncovering the nature of what is inquired into, a commitment not necessarily 
 
5 See Hackforth, Phaedrus, 134, who states that the “verve displayed by Socrates in his account 
…. justifies the belief that here we have Plato’s first announcement of a new discovery to 
which he attaches the highest importance”, and that Plato in the passage “for the first time 
formally expounds that philosophical method – the method of dialectic – which from now 
onwards becomes so prominent in his thought”.  
6 See F. M. Cornford (trans. and comm.), Plato’s Theory of Knowledge [Theory](London, 1935), 
184-185; recent expressions can be found in e.g. N. Notomi, The Unity of Plato’s Sophist 
(Cambridge, 1999), 74-78, and – more reservedly – Chr. Iber (intr. and comm.), Platon – 
Sophistes (trans. F. Schleiermacher) (Frankfurt a. M., 2007), 223-224. The view ultimately 
derives from the work of Julius Stenzel, see section I below for details. For a good overview of 
the controversy concerning the question whether collection and division replace other 
methods for arriving at essential definitions, see L. Brown, ‘Definition and Division in Plato’s 
Sophist’, in D. Charles (ed.), Definition in Greek Philosophy (Oxford, 2010), 151-171.   
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characterizing ordinary speaking and thinking. Thereby collection and division acquire a 
teleological directedness that cannot be fulfilled through the use of collection and division 
alone, but requires additional philosophical considerations concerning the nature of what is 
inquired into. For this reason, collection and division should not be regarded as identical with 
dialectic or seen as a new method for defining Forms.  
 Since a basic assumption underlying the consensus view sketched above is that 
Plato developed a new conception of dialectic in his supposedly later dialogues, section I of 
the article presents some brief considerations concerning the origins of this assumption. The 
main task of the article – which is to address the questions raised by Socrates’ claims that he 
is a lover of collection and division and that he has “until now” called those able to look to 
unity and over plurality dialectical (266b3-c1) – is undertaken in sections II, III and IV, in the 
following way.  
 Section II presents a detailed interpretation of the passage 265d3-266c2, which 
is the most explicit discussion of collection and division contained in the Phaedrus, arguing for 
the view that collection and division are not identical with dialectic.  
 Section III then illuminates the procedures of collection and division further by 
considering what they contribute to Socrates’ two speeches on eros from the first part of the 
dialogue. The section argues that Socrates’ first speech exemplifies collection and division as 
used in thinking and speaking in general, and that only his second speech begins to move in a 
clearly dialectical direction; it further argues that Socrates’ second speech, in so doing, relies 
on insights not arrived at through collection and division.    
 Section IV concludes the article by turning to the discussion of beautiful speaking 
and writing in the second half of the Phaedrus. I argue that Socrates’ aim here is not (contra a 
number of critics) to supply rhetoric with a scientific (or dialectical) basis, but rather, to 
consider how speaking well in general is related to philosophy or dialectic. In effect, this 
amounts to a deliberate broadening, on Plato’s part, of the notion of rhetoric, from being 
conceived as a specialist skill (irrespective of how this is related to philosophy or dialectic) to 
being a skill that relates to thinking and speaking in general. The section concludes the 
argument concerning collection and division by arguing that they are procedures of particular 
usefulness in dialectical inquiry when the inquiry is concerned with complex wholes; but such 
inquiry stands in need of additional considerations concerning the power such wholes and 
their parts have, in order for the inquiry to be truly dialectical. 
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I: Plato’s later dialectic? 
The now commonly accepted view that the Phaedrus is the first dialogue to announce Plato’s 
later conception of dialectic rests at the most basic level on the emergence of developmental 
readings of Plato that became popular during the 19th century, in particular on the idea that 
Plato in his supposedly later dialogues advanced a number of teachings that departed from 
those found in what had late in that century come to be regarded as the dialogues of his 
middle period. The view that Plato’s conception of dialectic was among the teachings that 
changed – and changed radically – in the late period ultimately owes its present-day currency 
to two scholars, Julius Stenzel and Richard Robinson.  
 In his Studien zur Entwicklung der Platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu 
Aristoteles (1917),7 Stenzel argued that the supposedly late dialogues display the new 
dialectical method of diairesis or division, and proposed the related view that this new 
method was the result of a change in Plato’s ontological orientation.8 Whereas Plato, 
according to Stenzel, up to and including the Republic was interested primarily in practical-
ethical matters, the later Plato developed a new interest in theoretical questions pertaining to 
the philosophy of nature.9 Stenzel maintained that this shift in ontological interest also 
effected a change in the manner in which Plato conceived of Forms. In what Stenzel regarded 
as Plato’s Socratic period, which according to him culminates in the Republic, the distinctive 
character of a Form of a thing was conceived of as identical with the aretê of that thing, 
understood as the specific virtue enabling the thing to perform its own task;10 in contrast, the 
 
7 J. Stenzel, Studien zur Entwicklung der Platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles – 
Arete und Diairesis [Studien] (Breslau, 1917). 
8 The idea that the later dialogues present a new kind of logic corresponding to a change in 
Plato’s conception of science was advanced already in 1897 by W. Lutoslawski in The Origin 
and Growth of Plato’s Logic, a work influenced by L. Campbell’s The Sophistes and Politicus of 
Plato of 1867. Stenzel’s work took its point of departure in views of the kind found in these 
two works as well as works by other writers concerned with the chronology of Plato’s 
dialogues. Stenzel’s work, in turn, forms part of the basis for F. M. Cornford’s interpretation of 
the discussion of dialectic found in the Sophist (see Cornford, Theory, 266, note 1, and 268, 
note 1), and Stenzel’s general approach to the history of philosophy had an impact on the 
thought of Richard Robinson (see R. Robinson, Plato’s Earlier Dialectic [Earlier] [New York, 
1941], 6). See also note 15 below.      
9 Stenzel, Studien, 1-2, see also 123-141. 
10 Stenzel, Studien, 8-9. 
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distinctive character of a Form in the later period was understood as “the substrate of the 
‘permanency of species’ in the realm of classes of the natural sciences”.11 The Forms thus 
came to resemble general concepts standing for natural kinds and Plato’s later ontological 
outlook therefore became the natural starting point for his pupil, Aristotle.12 A consequence of 
this change in ontological interest, according to Stenzel, was that Plato’s conception of 
dialectic changed as well. It now became a method for defining Forms understood as natural 
classes by mapping their place in a hierarchy of Forms through division.13 
 A quarter century later Richard Robinson – who was influenced by Stenzel both 
in his approach to the history of philosophy14 and in his understanding of Plato’s supposedly 
later conception of dialectic15 – laid the groundwork for an understanding of the development 
of Plato’s dialectic still dominant today, at least in Anglo-American scholarship, even though 
he does not provide a full treatment of Plato’s later conception of dialectic. In his influential 
Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, Robinson notably claimed that “the word ‘dialectic’ had a strong 
tendency in Plato to mean ‘the ideal method, whatever that may be’.”16 He nevertheless 
suggested that certain elements remained constant in Plato’s conception of dialectic, while 
others, such as the “conceptions of hypothesis and division … belonged to Plato’s idea of 
dialectic for parts of its life only”,17 with hypothesis belonging to its supposedly middle 
period, division to its supposedly late period. Like Stenzel, Robinson thus helped cement the 
 
11 ”als Substrat det ’Konstanz der Arten’ im naturwissenschaftlichen Klassenreich”, Stenzel, 
Studien, 2. 
12 M. L. Gill, Philosophos – Plato’s Missing Dialogue (Oxford, 2012) is a recent defense of the 
view that Plato’s treatment of forms in the so-called later dialogues “displays a distinctly 
Aristotelian bent” (10). 
13 Stenzel, Studien, 44 and 47-54; see also the almost verbatim echo in Hackforth, Phaedrus, 
135-136. 
14 See note 8 above. 
15 Stenzel’s views had an immediate impact on German scholarship. Having come to the 
attention of English-speaking scholars (the second edition of the German original was 
reviewed positively in 1932 in both the Journal of Hellenic Studies and the Classical Review) his 
Studien was translated into English, appearing in 1940. In his review from 1941 of this 
translation (The Philosophical Review, vol. 50 (5), 542-544), Richard Robinson suggests that 
Stenzel is (543) “loose or highly speculative in many details”, but he nevertheless insists that 
Stenzel “has shown, to all those who can spare the energy to struggle through his frightfully 
obscure exposition, that the method of division, puerile though it may seem to modern 
logicians, really was a new and important theory to Plato in his later period”. 
16 Robinson, Earlier, 74.  
17 Robinson, Earlier, 74. 
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view that diairesis, or the use of division, is a method peculiar to the supposedly later Plato, a 
view now endorsed by many Platonic scholars. 
 In contrast to Stenzel, modern scholars tend to take the view of diairesis 
advanced by Stenzel for granted without argument, perhaps because they think that it is 
uncontroversially true that the use of division in philosophical inquiry is peculiar to the 
dialogues now commonly regarded as late.18 It is therefore interesting to note that E. R. Dodds 
in his commentary on the Gorgias from 1959 recognized that the division of arts found in the 
passage 463e5-466a3 is an example of diairesis – although an early one according to Dodds19 
– and that Paul Friedländer from early on objected to Stenzel’s and Robinson’s suggestions 
concerning division, pointing out that division is used in a number of dialogues that are now 
commonly regarded as early.20 That the real basis for Stenzel’s and Robinson’s view of 
Platonic division is not a systematic study of the use of collection and division in Plato’s 
dialogues – such a study would not support their view unambiguously, since it can be argued 
that collection and division are found in dialogues such as the Gorgias, the Protagoras and the 
Republic21 – but is rather their understanding of the development of Plato and, in particular, of 
logic and science, is now often forgotten.  
 Platonists writing prior to the ascendancy of developmental readings of the 
dialogues viewed matters differently. Since they did not regard Plato’s thought as developing 
in any significant sense – the notion that the development of a philosopher’s thought should 
be viewed as something positive only resulted from the emergence of the German romantic 
and idealistic traditions in the late 18th and early 19th century – it is not surprising that they 
 
18 See e.g. Rowe, Phaedrus, note to 266d3 ff., who claims that it is Plato, “rather than Socrates” 
who is a lover of collection and division, without other argument than the received opinion 
that this “recommended procedure for establishing definitions (the mapping of reality) … 
plays a prominent role in three other dialogues, all late: Sophist, Statesman and Philebus.”  
19 E. R. Dodds (ed. and comm.), Plato - Gorgias (Oxford, 1959), 226. 
20 See P. Friedländer, Platon 2, 3rd edn. (Berlin, 1964), 337, note 9; Platon 3, 2nd edn. (Berlin, 
1961) 229-30; and his ‘Review of Richard Robinsons Earlier Dialectic’, Classical Philology, vol. 
40 (1945), 253-259, 253. P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, 1933), 295, likewise objects to 
the idea that diairesis is a new method peculiar to the later Plato.   
21 To show this in detail lies beyond the scope of this study. Some helpful suggestions in this 
direction can be found in K. F. Johansen, Studier over Platons Parmenides (København, 1964), 
45-51. See also Franz Lukas, Die Methode der Eintheilung bei Platon (Halle-Saale: C. E. M. 
Pfeffer, 1888) who seeks to account systematically for the way divisions structure the inquiry 
in a number of Platonic dialogues, hereunder dialogues now commonly regarded as belonging 
to the early (Gorgias) and the middle (Republic, Theaetetus) period dialogues.  
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did not share the view that Plato’s conception of dialectic underwent a radical development. 
Since the standard developmental account of Plato’s thought has come increasingly under 
criticism in the last few decades, it seems worthwhile to consider such approaches to Platonic 
dialectic. Here a mere sketch will have to suffice.  
 Some ancient Platonists, such as Plotinus, Proclus and Alcinous, regarded 
dialectic as a more or less unified method that utilized different procedures. They commonly 
regarded division as an important procedure, but in contrast to modern scholars they did not 
suppose that it was solely used in the dialogues we now tend to think of as late, nor did they 
hold the view that it led to essential definitions on its own. They rather saw it exemplified 
across Plato’s dialogues and regarded it as intimately connected with other dialectical 
procedures aimed at discovering the nature or essence of something. In On Dialectic or Peri 
Dialektikês, Plotinus thus identifies dialectic with a disposition (hexis) of being able, among 
other things, to speak about every thing “in a reasoned and orderly way”, stating what each 
thing “is and how it differs from other things and what it has in common with those among 
which it is” (I.3.4; 2-5; transl. Armstrong). This clearly suggests that he regarded collection 
and division, as discussed in particular in the Phaedrus and the Sophist, as an integral aspect of 
dialectic as such. In a similar vein Proclus, in his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, states 
that Socrates “almost everywhere hotly pursues” the procedures of collection and division 
discussed in the Phaedrus and the Sophist (In Parm., 649, 17-651, 111). Proclus, like Plotinus, 
thus regarded the methodical discussions found in these two dialogues as relevant for 
understanding the argumentative procedures of Plato’s Socrates in all of Plato’s dialogues, not 
merely in the so-called later dialogues, since among these Socrates is the main interlocutor 
only in the Philebus. Alcinous, moreover, suggests that dialectic inquires into the nature of 
each thing “either ’ from above’, by means of division and definition, or ’from below’, by means 
of analysis”.22 Plotinus mentions many other tasks dialectic enables one to perform that can 
hardly be resolved through collection and division, such as determining what common 
qualities beings have, what the good is, or whether a being really is what it is (I.3.4; 4-9).23  
 
22 Dillon, J. (trans. and comm.), Alcinous - The Handbook of Platonism (Oxford, 1993), chap. 5.1. 
23 It may be objected that the ancient Platonists, because they did not read Plato under the 
assumption that his thought developed, synthetized passages in Plato while overlooking 
radical differences. This may be true, but the point here is simply that the passages from the 
Phaedrus and the Sophist describing collection and division did not strike them as introducing 
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 As mentioned, even some modern scholars writing after developmental readings 
of Plato became popular have suggested that division is a procedure used in Plato’s dialogues 
generally, and they also question the view that collection and division in themselves are able 
to provide essential definitions; this, however, has been a minority view.24 
 The fact that scholars prior to the emergence of developmental readings did not 
see collection and division as peculiar to the supposedly late dialogues, and the further fact 
that some later scholars objected to Stenzel’s and Robinson’s view of divisions as providing 
essential definitions, suggest that this now commonly accepted view depends more on 
general assumptions concerning the way in which we should read Plato’s dialogues – namely 
as marking a development in Plato’s philosophical views and as part of a general development 
of logic and scientific thought – than on the texts themselves. At the very least, it should be 
admitted that the dialogues that expressly discuss collection and division do not immediately 
suggest that this is a new method.25  
 The question whether Plato changed his conception of dialectic, and, if he did, 
whether collection and division played a part in such a change is obviously complicated, and 
cannot be settled solely on the basis of an interpretation of the Phaedrus. But if it can be 
shown that the Phaedrus does not lend support to the modern understanding of collection and 
division as a new method for defining essences that supplant supposedly older methods, this 
will be an important challenge to the still prominent view of Plato’s supposed development. 
 
anything new because this is not something the text suggests by itself, but rather something 
that results from a preconceived idea of Plato’s development.       
24 During the 19th century the first scholars employing developmental models for the 
interpretation of Plato’s dialogues (e.g. Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, Zeller) regarded such 
dialogues as the Phaedrus, Sophist, and Philebus – i.e. dialogues we now too tend to think of as 
“methodical” dialogues that discuss the procedure of collection and division – as relatively 
early. The dialogues could, accordingly, be regarded as providing a methodological basis for 
Plato’s Socratic conversations. An overview of earlier German attempts to date Plato’s 
dialogues according to the supposed development of their philosophical content can be found 
in C. Ritter Platon: Sein Leben, seine Schriften, seine Lehre, vol. 1 (München, 1910), 230-231. 
Ritter’s critical discussion of these attempts (pp. 223-232) is still worth reading in its entirety; 
many of the claims advanced in his day concerning the development of Plato’s philosophical 
view of the soul, of rhetoric, of politics and the like are still being advanced today – often with 
the same absolute confidence for which Ritter criticized his contemporaries.   
25 This feature of the text is recognized by C. Kahn, Plato and the Dialogue Form (Cambrdige, 
1996), 299, note 6, who states that the emphasis on division in the Phaedrus is new, but that 
“Socrates insists that this is not an innovation!” 
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II: Socrates’ description of collection and division 
The task of the present section is to interpret the passage 266b3-c1 carefully and to consider 
its connection to its immediate context, i.e. the section 265d3-266b2. This is the natural 
starting point of our inquiry into the function of collection and division in the Phaedrus, since 
this extended passage contains the most explicit discussion of these two procedures in the 
dialogue. 
 
Speaking and thinking and the ability of the dialectician   
 
S.: Now I am myself, Phaedrus, a lover of these divisions and collections, so that I may be 
able both to speak and think; and if I think anyone else has the capacity to look to one 
and over what are naturally many, I pursue him ‘in his footsteps, behind him, as if he 
were a god.’ And furthermore, those who can do this – whether I give them the right 
name or not, god knows, but at any rate – up till now I call them dialectical. (266b3-c1)26  
 
The first thing we should take note of concerning this passage is that Socrates does not state 
that collection and division are identical with the kind of knowledge he elsewhere calls 
dialectic (dialektikê)27 or that the ability to perform them is all that characterizes those whom 
he here calls dialectical. What he claims is that he has called ‘dialectical’ those he considers 
able to look to one and over what are naturally many. This leaves open the possibility that 
dialecticians, according to Socrates, will also be able to perform other tasks in virtue of the 
fact that they are dialectical. 
 
26 τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵνα οἷός τε 
ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν: ἐάν τέ τιν᾽ ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ᾽ 
ὁρᾶν, τοῦτον διώκω κατόπισθε μετ᾽ ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ 
δρᾶν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς οἶδε, καλῶ δὲοὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικούς. 
27 E. Heitsch, ‘Dialektik und Philosophie in Platons >Phaidros<’, Hermes, 125.2 (1997), 131-
152 argues, p. 133, that Plato here uses the word dialektikos to point to “die rhetorische 
Kunst, mit dem jeweiligen Partner in der für ihn angemessenen Weise zu sprechen”, and does 
not mean “die eine, allen übrigen Wissenschaften überlegene >Dialektik<”; see also J. R. 
Trevaskis, ‘Division and its Relation to Dialectic and Ontology in Plato’, Phronesis, 12 (1967), 
118-129, who questions the view that division and dialectic are identical.  
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 A second point directly related to this is that Socrates claims to be a lover of 
collections and divisions with a specific purpose in mind: to be able to speak and think. This 
suggests that Plato intends a direct connection between Socrates’ ability to speak and think 
and the ability to collect and divide. What that connection is, however, is open to question.  
At first sight it might seem that Socrates is making the following suggestion: he is 
claiming that he is a lover of collection and division; he describes the ability to perform these 
operations as abilities to look to one and over many; he calls those able to perform these 
operations dialectical; and he finally claims that these dialectical procedures enable him – as a 
dialectician – to speak and think. If one assumes that dialectic is identical with collection and 
division, as most commentators do, it is likely that one will read Socrates’ statement in this 
way.  
But Socrates could also be suggesting that collections and divisions enable him, 
just as they enable any other human being, to speak and think, while at the same time 
suggesting that only those who are able to perform such divisions and collections on the basis 
of a certain kind of vision – described as an ability to look to one and over what are naturally 
many – deserve to be called dialectical. In other words, it is possible to read the passage as 
introducing a distinction between collection and division in general and a privileged or more 
adequate performance of these procedures, which we may call dialectical. Showing that the 
latter alternative is in fact the preferable reading is the main point in the overall argument of 
this article.  
The first step in this task is to point out that Socrates describes his own 
attachment to collection and division in a manner significantly different from the manner in 
which he describes the ability of a dialectician; he uses the plain and practically colloquial 
doublet “to speak and think” (legein te kai phronein) when explaining what collection and 
division enable him to do, but he describes the ability characteristic of those he calls 
dialectical in a more careful and even labored manner here translated rather literally as an 
ability to look “to one and over what are naturally many” (eis hen kai epi polla pephukoth’).  
The doublet “to speak and think” also occurs several times in Isocrates (see 
Panegyricus 50 and Antidosis 207, 244, 277, 308),28 where it designates intellectual activity in 
 
28 At Gorgias 449e6 Socrates suggests that rhetoric, since it enables people to speak (legein) 
about something, also enables them to think (phronein) about that something, while he at 
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general; those who master these abilities well, such as Isocrates according to his own 
evaluation and the Athenians in general, therefore outshine other men. We may assume that 
Socrates uses it in the same way, to designate the process of reasoning quite generally, 
depicted as carried out either in thought or in speech, thinking being, at least according to 
both the Theaetetus and the Sophist, an internal dialogue the soul carries out on its own (see 
Soph. 263e3-9 and Tht. 189e4-190a7).  
The ability that, according to Socrates, entitles one to be called dialectical, on the 
other hand, is described as a twofold ability, namely the ability to look (horan)  
1) eis hen – toward one and  
2)  epi polla pephykoth’–over what are naturally many. 
Before we look at the two prepositional phrases used by Socrates, a brief note on the 
participle pephukota is in order. Some translators and commentators take it with both hen 
and polla,29 in which case both the one and the many are characterized as natural. This is, 
however, a rather strained construal of the Greek.30 It may also be noted that Socrates in 
265e1-3, where he describes division, explicitly states that the ability to cut or divide should 
be performed “according to natural joints” (kat’ athra hêi pephuken), but he does not qualify 
his description of collection at 265d3-5 in a similar way.31 For both reasons it seems 
preferable to take pephukota with polla only. 
 We should also note that Socrates uses two different prepositions when 
describing the ability of the dialectician, that is, eis and epi. Eis when used with hen suggests 
that the dialectician is able to look to a single focal point. Epi, on the other hand, when used 
with the accusative polla pephykoth’, suggests that the dialectician is able to look over an 
extended, natural manifold, i.e. that he is able to gain a correct overview of the natural layout 
 
450a2 suggests that medical skill enables the doctor to speak and think about those who are 
ill, a further indication that the two verbs form a pair. 
29 See e.g. Hackforth, Phaedrus, note ad loc.  
30 Rowe, Phaedrus, note ad loc., therefore suggests that the participle should be read as 
masculine singular, agreeing with tin’ allon and its predicate dunatos at 266b5, i.e. that it is the 
capacity that Socrates believes entitles one to be called dialectical that is characterized as 
being natural. 
31 See P. Ryan, Plato’s Phaedrus – a commentary for Greek readers [Phaedrus] (Norman, 2012), 
note ad loc. Ryan reasonably suggests that Socrates’ emphasis on what is natural when it 
comes to division may be explained by the fact that “it is easy, often tempting, to divide a 
collection along lines suggested by something other than nature”. I shall return to this point 
below. 
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of that manifold (see LSJ, s.v. epi with accusative, entry 7). If we assume that Socrates in this 
passage is drawing a distinction between a general performance of collection and division and 
a qualified, and distinctly dialectical, performance thereof, we may further suggest that the 
dialectician’s use of collection and division is distinguished from the general performance in 
some way by the manner it is related to unity and natural plurality, described here as an 
ability to look (horan).  
 As we shall see below, Socrates describes division in general as an ability to 
divide according to natural joints, a fact that could be regarded as an objection to my 
suggested reading. At the same time, however, he clearly states that this ability may fail in 
achieving its aim. What I will be arguing in the following is, then, that the dialectical 
performance of division is differentiated from a more general use by the fact that a kind of 
pre-understanding – what Socrates described as the ability to look over what are naturally 
many – guides the divisions performed by the dialectician. I am, accordingly, not arguing that 
the fact that the dialectician attempts to divide in accordance with natural joints sets his use 
of division apart from the general use, but rather that the fact that his attempt to do so is 
based on something else than the (mere) ability to divide in itself sets dialectical division 
apart from division in general.   
We may also observe that Socrates introduces the entire discussion of noble or 
beautiful speeches – in which the passage under consideration stands as central – by 
suggesting that unless Phaedrus “engages in philosophy sufficiently (hikanôs) well he will 
never (oude … pote) be a sufficiently (hikanos) good speaker about anything (oudenos)” 
(261a4-5). We may take this suggestion as invoking a clear distinction between a general 
ability to speak – concerned with anything that may be spoken of – and a (philosophical) 
foundation for this general ability that, if adequately mastered, will enable one to exercise this 
general ability adequately. We shall return to this suggestion in section IV below, but for now 
we may simply suppose that this distinction also underlies Socrates’ utterances in the passage 
we have been considering. With this in mind, let us now turn to Socrates’ more elaborate 
description of collection and division.  
  
Socrates’ description of collection and division 
What Socrates understands by collection and division is set out in greater detail as follows. 
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S.: First, there is perceiving together and bringing into one form items that are scattered 
in many places, in order that one can, by circumscribing each thing, make clear whatever 
it is that one wishes to instruct one’s audience about on any occasion. Just so with the 
things said just now about love, about what it is when circumscribed: whether it was right 
or wrong, the speech was able to say what was at any rate clear and self-consistent 
because of that. 
P.: And what is the second kind of procedure you refer to, Socrates? 
S.: Being able to cut it up again, into forms, according to its natural joints, and not try to 
break any part into pieces, like an inexpert butcher; as just now the two speeches took the 
madness of reason as one form together, and just as a single body naturally has its parts 
in pairs, with both members of each pair having the same name, and labeled respectively 
left and right, so too the two speeches regarded derangement as naturally a single form in 
us, and the one cut off the part on the left-hand side, then cutting it again, and not giving 
up until it had found among the parts a love which is, as we say, ‘left-handed’, and abused 
it with full justice, while the other speech led us to the parts of madness on the right-
handed side, and discovering and exhibiting a love which shares the same name as the 
other, but is divine, it praised it as cause of our greatest good. (265d3-266b1)32 
 
Before looking more closely at this passage, we should note that Socrates prefaces it by 
stating (at 265c9-d1) that two forms or procedures (duoin eidoin)33 were exhibited by 
chance (ek tuchês) in the speeches he delivered previously in the dialogue – namely the two 
 
32 Σω. εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος 
δῆλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ. ὥσπερ τὰ νυνδὴ περὶ Ἔρωτος—ὃ ἔστιν 
ὁρισθέν—εἴτ᾽ εὖ εἴτε κακῶς ἐλέχθη, τὸ γοῦν σαφὲς καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ὁμολογούμενον διὰ 
ταῦτα ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν ὁ λόγος. - Φαῖ. τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον δὴ εἶδος τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; - Σω. τὸ πάλιν 
κατ᾽ εἴδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ᾽ ἄρθρα ᾗ πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος 
μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον: ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἄρτι τὼ λόγω τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς 
διανοίας ἕν τι κοινῇ εἶδος ἐλαβέτην, ὥσπερ δὲ σώματος ἐξ ἑνὸς διπλᾶ καὶ ὁμώνυμα πέφυκε, 
σκαιά, τὰ δὲ δεξιὰ κληθέντα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ὡς ἓν ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἶδος 
ἡγησαμένω τὼ λόγω, ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐπ᾽ ἀριστερὰ τεμνόμενος μέρος, πάλιν τοῦτο τέμνων οὐκ 
ἐπανῆκεν πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφευρὼν ὀνομαζόμενον σκαιόν τινα ἔρωτα ἐλοιδόρησεν μάλ᾽ ἐν 
δίκῃ, ὁ δ᾽ εἰς τὰ ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μανίας ἀγαγὼν ἡμᾶς, ὁμώνυμον μὲν ἐκείνῳ, θεῖον δ᾽ αὖ τινα 
ἔρωτα ἐφευρὼν καὶ προτεινάμενος ἐπῄνεσεν ὡς μεγίστων αἴτιον ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν. 
33 This is the translation suggested by Hackforth; for discussion, see Ryan, Phaedrus, note ad 
loc. 
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procedures he goes on to identify as collection and division in 265d3-266b1 – and that it 
would be gratifying if one could grasp their power (dunamis) in a skillful way (technê[i]); he 
further states that the rest of the speeches were “playfully done, by way of amusement”  
(paidiai pepaisthai). He thereby identifies the procedures of collection and division as 
procedures that has certain powers or abilities and suggests that they can be grasped 
skillfully; at the same time he implies that they were not employed in his own speeches on 
the basis of such a grasp (for they exhibited these procedures only by chance). If we assume 
that grasping the procedures of collection and division skillfully is characteristic of the 
dialectician, the implication is that Socrates’ two speeches in one way or another do not yet 
exemplify a fully skillful use of the power of collection and division. 
 This impression is confirmed by the fact that Socrates a few lines earlier (at 
265b5-c1) suggested that his second speech on eros expressed the erotic experience through 
an image that “allowed us perhaps to grasp some truth, though maybe also it took us in a 
wrong direction” and that this enabled him to mix together “a not wholly implausible 
speech” (ou pantapasin apithanon logon), which he also describes as “some mythical hymn” 
(muthikon tina humnon). Whatever merit the speech possesses, the implication of this 
statement is clearly that it may not be wholly truthful. If we assume that the aim of dialectic 
is to uncover reality – a fair assumption in the light of the way Socrates uses this expression 
elsewhere in Plato (see especially Rep. 533a10-c6 and 534b3-4; see also Phaed. 99e4-102a1 
with 65a9-3 and 78d1-3) – it again follows that Socrates’ use of collection and division in his 
second speech does not fully exhibit or exemplify this science. On the other hand, since 
Socrates explicitly states that both speeches exemplify collection and division, it seems to 
follow that collection and division cannot in themselves be identical with dialectic.  
 Let us now examine Socrates’ description of collection and division more closely. 
It is clear that Socrates regards each procedure as performing a distinct task. Collection helps 
horizein, i.e., to circumscribe or define, something and, by doing so, helps to clarify a subject of 
instruction. Division, on the other hand, is an ability to cut something up – presumably that 
which is gathered into a unity by collection, if we are to follow the example Socrates provides 
at 265e3-b1 – and to do so in a specific manner; it must involve cutting this something into 
forms (eidê) at the natural joints (arthra pephuken), and not attempt to break any part into 
pieces “in the manner of an inexpert butcher”.  
 16 
 We should start by considering what Socrates means by claiming that collection 
helps horizein something. The verb horizein is often taken to mean ‘to define’ in the sense of 
defining the essence of something. If we take Socrates as meaning to say that collection is an 
ability to give essential definitions of something, this looks like a serious objection to the 
suggestion that collection in general is not an ability that only the dialectician is able to 
perform, at any rate if we think that only a dialectician is able to provide essential definitions. 
But we may rule this objection out simply by observing that Socrates has already indicated 
that his speech (he here seems to be thinking of both his speeches as one, a point to which we 
shall return below) may have failed to grasp the whole truth about eros, a point he now 
repeats when he describes how the power to collect is illustrated by what he did when he 
defined love: “Just so with the things said just now about love, about what it is (ho estin) when 
circumscribed (horisthen): whether it was right or wrong, the speech was able to say what 
was at any rate clear and self-consistent because of that.” (265d3-7).  
The important thing to note here is that Socrates allows that a proposed 
‘definition’ or circumscription may be right or wrong, while at the same time characterizing 
such a proposed circumscription (i.e. what he says about eros at the beginning of his first 
speech) as exemplifying collection (265d3-7). It follows that he does not think that for a 
process to exemplify collection, it must define successfully, in the sense of doing so correctly 
and truly. To avoid confusion, it therefore seems better to translate horizein simply as ‘to 
circumscribe’ (we shall return to this point in the next section). Moreover, we have suggested 
that not only does Socrates leave open whether his proposed circumscription of eros is right 
or wrong, he also expressly avoids committing himself to the view that the process of which it 
was part was conducted on the basis of a skill. From this it follows that he neither thinks that 
a proposed circumscription arrived at through collection must be, if not correct and true, at 
least proposed through skill. 
 We may now consider more carefully the procedure of division. This procedure, 
it seems, is more complex than collection; as Socrates makes clear, it consists in 1) being able 
(dunasthai) to cut (diatemnein), into forms (kat’ eidê), according to natural joints (kat’ arthra 
hêi pephuken) and in 2) not trying (mê epicheirein) to break any parts of what one is cutting.  
 Clearly the procedure is more than a simple ability to divide; it is teleological in 
nature since the aim of this ability is to divide according to the natural joints of what one 
divides. But it remains a question whether divisions, in order to be divisions that exemplify 
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this ability, have to achieve this aim. If they have to, the suggestion that Socrates distinguishes 
between a general ability to divide and a dialectical ability to look over what are naturally 
many (at 266b3-7) will appear untenable. But we do not have to draw this conclusion.  
 First, we may well think that divisions that do not achieve their aim, because they 
fail to cut something in accordance with its natural joints, are still examples of this ability. 
Socrates does not state that division is simply an ability to cut in accordance with natural 
joints; on the contrary, he characterizes the ability in terms of the intention not to break any 
part (cf. mê epicheirein, understood to mean ‘not to attempt to …’). But it is possible for one to 
intend not to do something but still do it, or fail to avoid doing it; for instance, if one does not 
have a proper and full understanding of what one is doing. That such an inadequate 
performance of the ability to divide according to natural kinds is still an example of the 
exercise of the ability is a point we shall return to in section IV below. 
 Second, and in direct continuation of the previous point, it remains a question 
whether Socrates’ speeches on eros divide the nature of eros at its natural joints. If they do, as 
the summary at 265e3-266b1 at first sight suggests, this speaks against the suggestion that 
the procedure of division as employed in them does not exemplify a fully skillful (or 
dialectical) grasp of division. But if it can be established that they do not, or at any rate that 
only one of them does so, and can only be said to do so in a qualified manner, then this is 
confirmation of the thesis that divisions may be examples of the ability to divide according to 
natural joints, even if they do not divide correctly, since Socrates explicitly states that both his 
speeches exemplify division. To establish this, however, we need to look more closely at the 
divisions performed by Socrates in his speeches. 
 
III: Collection and division in Socrates’ two speeches  
When we now turn to Socrates’ two speeches, we shall limit ourselves to observations 
concerning the way collection and division inform their composition while disregarding most 
of their content. Our first aim is to demonstrate that Socrates’ first speech is based on 
collection and division but does not exemplify dialectical inquiry. Our second aim is to show 
that the divisions of his second speech form part of a inquiry using dialectic, but that this 
inquiry is motivated by considerations concerning the nature of eros and the soul that do not 
depend on collection and division.  
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                      Before looking more closely at the two speeches, some observations concerning 
their inter-relation are called for. Looking at the speeches from the perspective Socrates 
provides on them in his summary at 265e3-266b1, one may get the impression that they 
constitute two halves of one speech that together investigate the whole phenomenon of eros. 
This impression is not mistaken, but taken in isolation the summary tends to blur the fact that 
the speeches were, as Socrates points out at 265a1, opposed to each other.34 More precisely, 
the two speeches together exemplify, as Socrates makes explicit at 262c5-7 (see also 265a2-
3), a specific manner of speaking that he terms ‘to dispute’ (antilegein, 261c5, see also 
261d10). By this he means to dispute in a broad sense, the activity of being engaged in an 
argument in general, but he includes under this also the more specific activity where the same 
person is advancing contrary arguments concerning the same thing, that is, discussing or 
disputing with himself or herself (cf. 261c10-4e).35  
                      We shall return to the question how we are to understand Socrates’ conception 
of antilegein in part IV; for now the important thing to note is that the two speeches are 
eventually (but not from the start) presented as parts of one argument or “speech”, the aim of 
which is to make the same phenomenon – eros – first appear to be one thing, namely bad, and 
then appear to be the opposite, namely good. This is important to bear in mind for two 
reasons. First, if the speeches are intended to contradict each other, they must circumscribe 
their subject – eros – in basically the same way. Otherwise it might be objected that the first 
speech made one thing appear bad, while the second speech made something else appear 
 
34 Some commentators emphasize that there is a discrepancy between Socrates’ harmonious 
summary of the speeches and the speeches themselves. G. R. F. Ferrari, Listening to the 
Cicadas (Cambridge, 1987), 59 suggests that Plato “by tinkering with Socrates’ memory … 
demonstrates that the leisurely perspective of analytic hindsight is just that: a perspective; 
and different from the perspective from which Socrates delivered the poetry he now 
misleadingly encapsulates”; Plato thereby signals that both the “poetic” perspective of the 
speeches and the “analytic” perspective offered in the summary are one-sided and “must 
supplement each other”. C. Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, 2nd edn. [Self-
Knowledge] (Pennsylvania, 1996), 175-6 sees a discrepancy between Socrates’ description of 
an “art of thinking” at 265d3-266b2 that merely analyses our opinions, and the complex 
connection between pre-reflective knowledge and philosophical inquiry displayed in 
dialogue.  
35 That Socrates advances contrary arguments concerning the same subject in the Protagoras 
– the question whether or not virtue may be taught – and that this is a key element in the 
structure of the dialectical inquiry in that dialogue, is argued for in V. Politis, ‘What do the 
arguments of the Protagoras amount to?’, Phronesis 57 (2012), 209-239. 
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good, and therefore that the second speech did not really contradict the first. Second, since the 
two speeches jointly illustrate the activity of disputing, we cannot suppose that, when taken 
together, their aim is – purely and simply – to advance the account of the nature of eros 
through division, from a less satisfactory and complete to a more satisfactory and complete 
account – as Socrates’ summary might seem to suggest. Rather, they move from censuring 
eros (in the first speech) to praising it (in the second), as Socrates also points out (cf. 265c5-
6). I shall argue that since both speeches exemplify collection and division, the shift from 
censure to praise is animated by something other than collection and division.  
 
The collection underlying Socrates’ speeches 
As we have seen, when describing collection at 265d3-7, Socrates states that it helps to clarify 
what one wishes to teach and (referring to his previous speeches) that by circumscribing36 
eros in the way it did, “the speech was able to say what was at any rate clear and self-
consistent because of that”. A closer inspection of the two speeches, however, reveals that 
only the first speech begins by circumscribing eros, namely as a particular kind of irrational 
desire or madness, while the second speech simply begins from the assumption that eros is a 
kind of madness (244a3-6).37 This should not surprise us, given the fact that the speeches 
make up a single long speech exemplifying disputation: since the different parts of the 
disputation are concerned with the same subject matter, and since collection helps 
circumscribe the subject matter, it makes sense that only the first speech should exemplify 
collection and that the second should simply rely on that initial demarcation of the subject. 
Here is the description of the purpose of circumscription found at the beginning of Socrates ’ 
first speech. 
 
“In everything, my boy, there is one starting-point for anyone who is going to deliberate 
successfully: he must know what it is that he is deliberating about, or he will inevitably 
miss everything. Most people are unaware that they do not know what each thing really 
 
36 I render horizein and its cognates as ‘to circumscribe’ etc. for reasons given above in section 
II; see also below for further justification of this translation. 
37 That the reference of 265d3-7 “must be to [Socrates’] definition of love in the first speech” 
is correctly emphasized by Rowe, Phaedrus, note ad loc. See also De Vries, Commentary, note 
ad loc.  
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is. So they fail to reach agreement about it at the beginning of their enquiry, assuming 
that they know what it is, and having proceeded on this basis they pay the penalty one 
would expect: they agree neither with themselves nor with each other. So let us, you and 
I, avoid having happen to us what we find fault with in others: since the question before 
you and me is whether one should rather enter into friendship with lover or non-lover, 
let us establish an agreed definition of love, about what sort of thing it is and what 
power it possesses, and look to this as our point of reference while we make our enquiry 
whether it brings advantage or harm.” (237b7-d3)38 
 
What motivates this speech – as well as the next, we may add (see 244a3-4) – is the question 
whether one should enter into friendship with a lover or a non-lover. This question raises a 
deeper question, what love is and what power it possesses, and Socrates is suggesting that 
circumscribing love will help settle the question whether love brings advantage or harm, the 
settling of which will help decide whether one should befriend a lover or a non-lover.  
 The passage thus seems to manifest a line of reasoning Socrates advocates in 
several dialogues known in the scholarly literature as the “priority of definition”: if we are to 
decide whether x has the property of y or z, we need to decide what x, essentially, is, since we 
are able to settle the question what properties x has only if we first understand the essence of 
x; and what that essence is cannot be decided by adducing examples of x. It would be 
premature to conclude, however, that it is this principle that Socrates is advancing here. First, 
there is nothing specifically Platonic in claiming that, in order to decide whether something 
has a certain property, we need to circumscribe what that something is; Isocrates, for 
instance, invokes this principle.39 Second, the principle as stated here is not particularly 
 
38 περὶ παντός, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βουλεύσεσθαι: εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἡ 
βουλή, ἢ παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη. τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς λέληθεν ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν οὐσίαν 
ἑκάστου. ὡς οὖν εἰδότες οὐ διομολογοῦνται ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς σκέψεως, προελθόντες δὲ τὸ εἰκὸς 
ἀποδιδόασιν: οὔτε γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογοῦσιν. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ σὺ μὴ πάθωμεν ὃ 
ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμῶμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὁ λόγος πρόκειται πότερα ἐρῶντι ἢ μὴ μᾶλλον εἰς 
φιλίαν ἰτέον, περὶ ἔρωτος οἷόν τ᾽ ἔστι καὶ ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὁμολογίᾳ θέμενοι ὅρον, εἰς τοῦτο 
ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιώμεθα εἴτε ὠφελίαν εἴτε βλάβην παρέχει. 
39 See To Nicocles, 9: πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον τί τῶν βασιλευόντων ἔργον ἐστίν: ἂν γὰρ ἐν 
κεφαλαίοις τὴν δύναμιν ὅλου τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς περιλάβωμεν, ἐνταῦθ᾽ ἀποβλέποντες 
ἄμεινον καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν ἐροῦμεν. Socrates’ statement at 237b7-d3 seems literally to echo 
this passage. That the principle in this form is common to rhetoricians and Plato is argued in 
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controversial; it is obviously true that I cannot know whether something has a certain 
property if I do not know what that something is at all (cf. Men. 71b4-7). The principle only 
becomes controversial if you make strict demands concerning the way one is allowed to 
define something, for instance that you are not allowed to point to particular examples as 
definitions or to rely on commonly accepted views – the kind of strict demand that Plato’s 
Socrates commonly imposes on his interlocutors.40 
 The circumscription of eros that Socrates proceeds to offer does not live up to 
any such demands, but is simply based on commonly accepted opinions.41 If we use his 
description of collection at 265d3-5 as our guide to understanding circumscription – it is a 
procedure that is supposed to bring “into one form items that are scattered in many places” 
by perceiving them together – what most readily presents itself as a circumscription of eros in 
the first speech is what we find in the lines 237d3-238a2. Here Socrates circumscribes eros as 
a kind of desire, specifically directed at pleasure, whose rule in the soul is hubris. He thereby 
brings one type of desire together with other types of desire under one heading or form, 
namely the desire that leads irrationally. In making this collection and associated 
circumscription, Socrates admits that he is merely spelling out “what is clear to everyone” 
(237d4) concerning eros.  
 If these observations are correct, we may conclude that the horos Socrates 
mentions at 237d1 simply means ‘circumscription’, not definition in any strict sense, just as 
horizein at 265d4 means ‘to circumscribe’. The horos simply circumscribes eros in a manner 
convenient for the argument Socrates is about to give, namely that the lover is harmful to the 
beloved. And since the second speech begins from the assumption that the lover is mad – 
where it is understood that madness is a form of irrationality and irrational desire – we see 
that this circumscription also underlies the second speech. 
 
Divisions in Socrates’ first speech 
 
M. Brown and J. Coulter, ‘The Middle Speech of Plato’s Phaedrus’, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, 9 (1971), 405-23, see in particular 407-10. 
40 That the principle only becomes controversial once these demands are made is argued in V. 
Politis, The Structure of Enquiry in Plato’s Early Dialogues (Cambridge, 2015). 
41 See H.-G. Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 5 (Tübingen, 1985), 62. 
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Beginning with this speech, we should note that divisions are most obviously used to divide 
excess; this is clear from Socrates’ claim that excess has “many limbs and many forms” 
(238a2-3), such as gluttony, alcoholism, and eros (238a6-c4). The fact that he talks of excess 
as having “many limbs” (polumeles; 238a3) suggests that this division is aimed at cutting in 
accordance with the “natural joints” of excess. We may further observe that he performs the 
division while looking to the various objects at which excess may be directed – food (238a6), 
drink (238b2), and bodily beauty (238c2). He thereby regards excess as a kind characterized 
by an ‘object-directedness’ and divides it into sub-kinds in accordance with the various 
objects it may be directed at, a way of dividing complex phenomena – such as knowledge, 
virtue, or various kinds of speech – that we find in many Platonic dialogues (see e.g. Gorg. 
449e1-452e8, 463a8-c3, 464b3-465c7; Chrm. 165c4-166b6, Rep. 438a7-439a7). At the same 
time, we see that this division is rather trivial, and almost routine in nature; it merely spells 
out more clearly what Socrates must already have presupposed when performing the 
collection at 237d3-238a2, namely that eros is one of several types of irrational desires.  
 The division of excess, however, itself relies on another division that is neither 
trivial nor obviously in accordance with natural joints. When beginning his collection at 
237d3-4 by stating that eros is a kind of desire, Socrates further claims that “we know that 
men desire the beautiful (epithumousi tôn kalôn) even if they are not in love.” (237d4-5). By 
recognizing a non-erotic desire for beauty or what is noble – Socrates may be thinking of the 
desire for performing great deeds – he is led to the problem how one should distinguish an 
erotic from a non-erotic human being if both may be said to be desiring the same thing. He 
suggests this solution:  
 
“We must next observe that in each of us there are two kinds of things (duo idea) which 
rule and lead us, which we follow wherever they may lead, the one an inborn desire for 
pleasures, another an acquired opinion which aims at the best.” (237d6-9)42 
  
It seems fair to assume that Socrates by the expression “two kinds of things” that are “in each 
of us” means two parts or principles of the soul. The further fact that he uses the term idea 
 
42 δεῖ αὖ νοῆσαι ὅτι ἡμῶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ δύο τινέ ἐστον ἰδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε, οἷν ἑπόμεθα ᾗ 
ἂν ἄγητον, ἡ μὲν ἔμφυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἄλλη δὲ ἐπίκτητος δόξα, ἐφιεμένη τοῦ 
ἀρίστου. 
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suggest that what we have here is a division in the sense discussed at 265d3-266b1, namely of 
the soul, a division meant to support the ensuing division of desires by demarcating irrational 
desires from other desires. It is therefore remarkable that Socrates offers no justification for 
his division of the soul; the suggestion that they simply have to recognize these two parts (dei 
noêsai; 237d6) looks most of all like an appeal to commonly held beliefs about the soul.43 The 
result is that the division between rational and irrational desires seems less than firm; at the 
very least we should wonder whether the division of excess is entirely adequate.   
 But while it is obvious that neither the collection nor the divisions contained in 
the first speech form part of a philosophically adequate inquiry into eros, they undoubtedly 
help structure the first speech in a clear and pedagogical manner, making it structurally 
superior to the earlier speech of Lysias, as Socrates emphasizes at 263d5-6. The speech 
thereby illustrates that collection and division may achieve the aim of imposing an effective 
order on a speech, and in this sense enable one to speak and think, without forming part of a 
dialectical inquiry.  
 
Divisions in Socrates’ second speech 
This speech offers a division of divinely inspired madness complementary to the division of 
excess in the first speech; and like the division of excess this division is not particularly 
informative – Socrates acknowledges that he only states “things that are obvious to everyone” 
(244b5). The division of divine madness into inspired prophecy (244a8-244d5), rites of 
purification (244d5-245a1), and divinely inspired poetry (245a1-8) most of all resembles a 
kind of inductive reasoning meant to make plausible that eros, as madness, may be 
benevolent and divine: since we know that there are other kinds of divine madness and that 
they are benevolent, it is possible that eros could be a kind of divine madness too and 
benevolent. 
 This is not the only division found in the second speech, however. Just as the 
division of excess in the first speech presupposed a division of the soul, the division of divine 
madness depends on a general division of madness into good and bad madness that is 
introduced in the dialogue at 244a5-6. It is only on the basis of this division that Socrates is 
 
43 Brown & Coulter, ‘Middle Speech’, argue that the view of the soul here is the view of 
Isocrates, see also R. L. Howland, ‘The Attack on Isocrates in the Phaedrus’, The Classical 
Quarterly, 31 (1937), 151-159. 
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later able to regard the divisions performed in the first speech as one part of a whole, and so 
as by itself incomplete. The division of madness into good and bad thus reveals that what the 
first speech regarded as the trunk of a tree to be divided into its various branches, is, when 
viewed from a higher level, only a branch on a larger trunk, namely madness. The second 
speech thereby implicitly takes the first speech to task for having begun its discussion of eros 
too early, so to say, or with a supposed unity that is not really a whole. 
The division of madness raises two important questions. First, what is the basis 
for this division? The first speech took for granted, while circumscribing eros, a commonly 
accepted view concerning the soul and irrational desires. The second speech, in contrast, 
seems to base its division of madness into good and bad on some kind of insight into the 
nature of eros that Socrates describes as a kind of divine inspiration or prophetic knowledge 
(242b8-d2, 262d2-7). Both speeches thus base their divisions of the soul and madness on an 
understanding of the soul and the nature of eros that do not stem from the procedures of 
collection and division, but comes to expression in collection and division. 
 Second, if the division between good and bad madness is guided by an insight 
into eros not stemming from a procedure of division, the question whether this division is any 
more sound and well-founded than the division of the soul in the first speech becomes 
pressing. In contradistinction to the first speech, however, which never questions its own 
divisions, the second speech proceeds to support its fundamental division of eros into good 
and bad. For the speech does not simply claim that eros belongs under the heading of divine 
madness, but instead seeks to argue that this suggestion is plausible. In arguing for this 
suggestion, the speech initiates a long and complicated investigation of the nature of the soul 
(introduced at 245c3-5) that involves a collection and division performed on the soul (see 
246a3-4 and 253c7-d1, where Socrates uses the same expressions about the soul and its 
parts, namely idea and eidê, that he uses when describing collection and division at 265d3-5 
and 265e1-3), and also a complex investigation of the proper objects of human desire, the 
Forms. This investigation, in turn, is based on considerations concerning the soul and the 
Forms that do not seem to rely on collection and division alone.  
 Collection and division in the second speech thus form part of a larger inquiry 
that may rightfully be regarded as dialectical, in the sense that it undertakes a genuine inquiry 
into the subject matters it treats off (whether it is a fully ‘scientific’ example of such an inquiry 
is another matter). This inquiry corrects the view of eros arrived at through collection and 
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division in the first speech, and parts of this inquiry are clearly based on something else than 
collection and division, be that a divinely inspired understanding of eros or some kind of prior 
knowledge of the soul and the Forms. 
 
IV: Speaking and thinking, rhetoric and dialectic 
This section, that treats of the discussion of beautiful speaking and writing in the second half 
of the Phaedrus, has two main tasks. The first task is to demonstrate that Socrates here aims at 
showing that speaking in general stands in need of philosophy if it is to be conducted 
adequately, not that rhetoric, if grounded in dialectic, may be rendered a genuine science or 
skill, a claim common in the secondary literature on the dialogue. This serves to conclude the 
argument that collection and division are procedures that underlie thinking and speaking in 
general. The second task is to show that collection and division, when used as dialectical 
procedures, are concerned primarily with the relation between wholes and parts and the 
question what powers they possess, and that the latter question has to be settled in part 
through considerations that do not depend on collection and division. This serves to conclude 
the argument that collection and division are not identical with dialectic, but rather 
procedures that may be necessary, while by themselves insufficient for establishing essential 
definitions. The section will concentrate on the passages 261a3-262c7 and 269d2-271c5. 
 Before taking up the passages, a short consideration of the dramatic background 
against which our first passage should be read is called for, since this will help us appreciate 
the real significance of the discussion of rhetoric in this passage. Throughout the Phaedrus, 
Socrates and Phaedrus are portrayed as lovers of logoi (see 227b9-11, 227d5-228a4, 228b5-
c1, 236e1-5 and 242a7-b3).44 At the same time, Phaedrus is depicted as interested in speeches 
primarily as a means of persuasion, i.e. in rhetoric (see 260a3-4 and 269c9), while Socrates is 
portrayed as interested in logoi understood both quite generally as speeches (261a4-5) and as 
philosophical arguments (257b6). This difference in their interest structures the dramatic 
exchange between the two interlocutors in the second half of the dialogue. When Socrates 
raises the question how one should write and speak in order to do so beautifully or nobly 
(258d7, 259e1-2) – the question that initiates the discussion of rhetoric – Phaedrus’ interest 
in the question is a result of his admiration of the skill that enables a good speechwriter to 
 
44 For a discussion of this motif, see Griswold, Self-Knowledge, 21-23. 
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write clever and persuasive speeches. Socrates, on the other hand, has a very different view of 
what it means to write and speak beautifully or nobly, a view he seeks to convince Phaedrus is 
superior, thereby seeking to redirect Phaedrus’ interest from rhetoric toward philosophy (see 
257b1-6).45 Their differing interest in logoi also comes to the fore in Socrates’ suggestion that 
one must have knowledge of the truth in order to speak and write, at least if you intend to do 
so nobly or beautifully, as against Phaedrus’ objection that he has heard that the public 
speaker or politician (rhêtôr) needs to know only what appears just to the multitude, not what 
really is so (259e4-260a4).  
  
Rhetoric, antilogikê, and collection and division (261a3-262c7) 
It is against this dramatic background that we must read the opening lines of our first passage, 
where Socrates “summons” some arguments intended to persuade Phaedrus that “unless he 
engages in philosophy sufficiently well (hikanôs philosophêsê[i]), neither will he ever be 
adequate at speaking about anything (oude hikanos pote legein estai peri oudenos).” (261a4-5)  
 We should observe that Socrates is not simply suggesting that the arguments are 
intended to convince Phaedrus that rhetoric or political and public speeches require 
philosophy; rather, they are intended to convince him that, unless he engages in the activity of 
philosophy sufficiently, he will never become adequate at speaking at any time about anything 
(pote … peri oudenos). The arguments clearly concern speaking in general, and are intended to 
make plausible a teleological view of speaking and its dependence on philosophy if it is to 
fulfill its end. 
 To understand this teleological view properly, we will have to consider what 
Socrates means by being “adequate at speaking” and to “engage in philosophy sufficiently”. 
We also need to see more clearly how this general claim about speaking is connected to 
Phaedrus’ interest in rhetoric. Socrates proceeds to state the following: 
 
Well then, will not the science of rhetoric as a whole be a kind of leading of the soul by 
means of things said, not only in the law-courts and all other kinds of public gatherings, 
but in private ones too – the same science, whether it is concerned with small matters or 
 
45 This is argued in E. Asmis, ‘Psychagogia in Plato’s Phaedrus’, Illinois Classical Studies 11 
(1986), 153-172; see also J. Moss, ‘Soul-Leading: The Unity of the Phaedrus, Again’, Oxford 
Studies in Anicent Philosophy, 43 (2012), 1-23.  
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large ones, and something which possesses no more value, if properly understood, when 
it comes into play with things of importance than when it does with things of no 
importance? (261a7-b2)46  
  
We should again take note of the generality of Socrates’ statement – what he terms rhetoric 
may concern anything and can be performed everywhere. As Phaedrus points out (261b3-5), 
this account does not capture what is traditionally understood by ‘rhetoric’:47 according to the 
traditional understanding, rhetoric is concerned mostly with lawsuits and questions 
concerning what is just (see 261c8), and with public speeches and questions concerning what 
is good (see 261d3-4). In consequence of this objects, Socrates proceeds to argue for his 
controversial view.  
  It should be observed that had Socrates wanted to argue simply that rhetoric 
should be grounded in philosophy, as is often assumed,48 arguing for this controversial 
account of rhetoric would be superfluous. He could simply have argued that, in order to be 
adequate at speaking at all, one has to philosophize sufficiently; it would then follow that, 
since rhetoric is a kind of speaking, it too, requires philosophy. Or, even more simply, he could 
have argued directly that rhetoric as understood by Phaedrus stands in need of philosophy, 
and forget about the general activity of speaking. The fact that he instead proceeds to argue 
that rhetoric is not limited in scope, as Phaedrus believes it is, but may concern anything, 
demonstrates that Socrates’ real interest lies in speaking in general.  
 Socrates’ argument for broadening the scope of rhetoric to include speaking and 
thinking in general sets out from the two kinds of speeches Phaedrus acknowledges as 
 
46 ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν 
δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις, ἡ αὐτὴ σμικρῶν τε καὶ 
μεγάλων πέρι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντιμότερον τό γε ὀρθὸν περὶ σπουδαῖα ἢ περὶ φαῦλα γιγνόμενον; 
47 We should be careful not to read into Phaedrus’ position Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric, 
that it is “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (Rhet. 
1355b25-26, trans. Rhys Roberts), or modern conceptions of rhetoric derived from it. For 
Aristotle’s view is evidently much closer to the view of noble speaking and writing that 
Socrates is arguing for than it is to Phaedrus’. Consequently, we misunderstand the dramatic 
exchange between Socrates and Phaedrus if we ascribe an Aristotelian understanding of 
rhetoric to Phaedrus. 
48 See e.g. Hackforth, Phaedrus, 122; E. Heitsch (trans. and comm.), Platon: Phaidros 
(Göttingen, 1997), 126-135. For a recent and perceptive defense of this traditional view, see 
M. McCoy, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists (Cambridge, 2008) 167 ff.   
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rhetorical, forensic speeches concerning the just, and deliberative speeches concerning the 
good. Both, Socrates argues, are essentially concerned with the act of disputing (antilegein), 
and he adds that the one who disputes with skill (technê[i]) is able to make the same thing 
appear to his audience sometimes one thing, sometimes the opposite (261c4-d4). Socrates 
then suggests that Zeno or the “Eleatic Palamedes” is basically engaged in the same activity, 
only he is not concerned with the just and the good, but with “like and unlike, one and many, 
at rest and in motion” (2616-8). Phaedrus accepts all this and Socrates accordingly concludes 
that  
 
… the science of disputation is not only concerned with law-courts and public addresses, 
but, so it seems, there will be this one skill – if indeed it is one – in relation to everything 
that is said, by which a man will be able to make everything which is capable of being 
made to resemble something else resemble everything which it is capable of being made 
to resemble, and to bring it to light when someone else makes one thing resemble 
another and disguises it. (261d10-e4)49 
 
Thereby Socrates reaches the conclusion that rhetoric may concern anything. However, by 
changing the name from rhetorikê to antilogikê or ‘the skill of disputation’, he again reveals 
that his own interest lies elsewhere than Phaedrus’. For what Socrates is in effect arguing is 
that the activity Phaedrus identifies as rhetoric – an understanding identical with the 
understanding of rhetoric advanced by the Platonic Gorgias (see Gorgias 452e1-4) – is a 
subpart of a much broader phenomenon, disputation. As Socrates’ illustrations drawn from 
traditional rhetoric also make clear, by disputation he means a very broad phenomenon that 
may be conducted with skill, but which is not itself a skill: the activity we engage in whenever 
we try to convince people that something is the case in opposition to claims advanced by an 
opposing party. Even Eleatic ‘antilogic ’, in which Zeno specialized, is simply a particular 
version of it.  
 
49 οὐκ ἄρα μόνον περὶ δικαστήριά τέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀντιλογικὴ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίαν, ἀλλ᾽, ὡς ἔοικε, 
περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, εἴπερ ἔστιν, αὕτη ἂν εἴη, ᾗ τις οἷός τ᾽ ἔσται πᾶν παντὶ 
ὁμοιοῦν τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἷς δυνατόν, καὶ ἄλλου ὁμοιοῦντος καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένου εἰς φῶς 
ἄγειν. 
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  Having established that rhetoric may concern anything and may be performed 
anywhere and is a kind of disputation, Socrates proceeds to demonstrate that skillful 
disputation depends on knowledge of the truth. It is not entirely clear whether Socrates by 
this means to suggest that the activity of disputing is identical with the activity of speaking in 
general, about anything, or whether he only regards it as a particularly important example of 
this. But it seems fair to assume that his demonstration is intended to make plausible the 
overall claim that, in order to speak adequately about anything, one needs to engage 
sufficiently in philosophy.  
 To show that disputation presupposes knowledge of the truth in order to be 
performed adequately or skillfully, Socrates focuses on the phenomenon of deception (apatê), 
apparently because deception, when it is the result of a dispute, is apt to illustrate what 
Socrates means by the complex claim that disputation performed with skill will enable one “to 
make everything which is capable of being made to resemble something else resemble 
everything which it is capable of being made to resemble”.   
 The first part of the argument runs as follows. Deception is most likely to come 
about concerning things that differ only a little from each other (261e6-7). Moreover, if you 
seek to deceive someone by making a thing appear as something else, it is easier to do this if 
you do it by small steps (262a2-3). But this means that deception requires precise knowledge 
of the resemblance and the dissimilarity between things (262a5-7).  
 If we try to illustrate what Socrates is arguing through the previous speeches – 
they are, after all, said to illustrate the activity of disputation (see 262c5-7) – we may say that, 
in order to make eros appear as something (e.g. either as good or as bad) you need to know 
what other good or bad things eros resembles. If you possess that knowledge, you may 
convince someone that it is bad by establishing that eros is similar to something bad, such as 
drunkenness, or convince him that it is good, by likening it to something good, such as 
inspired poetry. 
 The real crux of the argument, however, lies in the following claim: one cannot 
discern (diagignôskein) the resemblances other things may have to a particular thing, if one is 
ignorant of what each thing truly or really is (alêtheian hekastou; 262a9-11). And this means 
that one cannot deceive another in a skillful manner, unless one has recognized what each of 
the things is (ho estin hekaston tôn ontôn; 262b5-8). By this, Socrates must mean that one 
needs to know what something essentially is (the expression ho estin at 262b8 taken together 
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with alêtheian hekastou at 262a9 indicates this) if one is to deceive someone through the use 
of skillful disputation. If we turn to Socrates’ own speeches, the claim must be that, in order to 
deceive another concerning eros in a skillful manner, one must know what eros essentially is.  
 We should note that Socrates is not making the implausible suggestion that you 
cannot deceive another about something unless you understand the essence of that something 
– for this, you would probably need to know only how that thing appears to someone else. 
What Socrates is claiming is rather that you cannot do so skillfully, or with expertise (see 
technikos at 262c5), without knowing the essence of the thing you are trying to ‘dress up’ as 
something else. The reasoning behind this claim must be something like the following: in 
order to deceive other people in a skillful manner you must know the essence of things, 
because this essence explains why certain things appear to resemble certain other things; the 
reason why eros may resemble drunkenness, for instance, is not simply our common opinions 
about eros, but rather something in the nature of eros itself.  
 Socrates may thereby be said to have demonstrated that one needs to engage 
sufficiently in philosophy in order to be able to speak adequately about anything. For 
philosophy or dialectic, the ‘science’ of the philosopher, is, according to claims about dialectic 
elsewhere in Plato, what gives us knowledge of essences (see especially Rep. 525b9-d3, 
533a10-c6 and 534b3-4; see also Phaed. 78d1-3 with 99e4-102a1). As we have also seen, 
Socrates reinterpretation of the concept of rhetoric indicates that the argument is not 
concerned with traditional rhetoric but with speaking in general; at the dramatic level of the 
dialogue this reinterpretation can be seen as intended to redirect the attention of the rhetoric-
loving Phaedrus. What we still need to consider is how collection and division fit into 
Socrates’ general claim about the dependence of adequate speech on philosophy.   
 
Collection and division in dialectical inquiry and the power to act and suffer (269d2-271c5) 
When Socrates concludes the first part of his argument concerning speaking and 
philosophizing, he proceeds to suggest, at 262c10-d2, that his two speeches on eros illustrated 
“how someone who knows the truth can mislead his audience by making play in what he 
says”. He thereby presents himself as knowing the nature of eros. As we saw in section III, this 
knowledge results in part from something other than collection and division. As we also saw, 
collection and division were used in his second speech as part of a larger inquiry, while this 
was not true of his first speech. When we now turn to our last passage, we return to our main 
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question, how the use of collection and division as general procedures underlying speaking 
and thinking differ from the use of these procedures within dialectical inquiry.  
 Prior to our passage, in 268a5-269c5, Socrates criticizes conventional rhetoric 
for being a mere knack without any scientific or technical merit, a critique that leads Phaedrus 
to ask Socrates “how and from where” one may acquire “the skill which belongs to the real 
expert in rhetoric and the really persuasive speaker (tên tou tô[i] onti rhêtorikou te kai 
pithanou technê)” (269c9-d1). This skill is not the self-professed skill of sophists like Gorgias 
and Protagoras, but the skill that Socrates earlier termed antilogikê.  
 Socrates’ begins his explanation how one acquires this skill with the ironic 
assertion that Pericles became the most consummate of all when it comes to rhetoric because 
he acquired “babbling (adoleschia) and lofty talk about nature (meteôrologias phuseôs peri)” 
from Anaxagoras, who also helped him arrive at “the nature of mind and the absence of mind 
(epi physin nou te kai anoias aphikomenos)”; for these abilities, Socrates suggests, are required 
by all the major crafts (269e1-270a8).50  
 Behind the irony, however, is a serious point, namely that rhetoric as now 
conceived of by Socrates – as a kind of soul-leading that depends on disputation – must be 
concerned with the nature of things. More precisely, Socrates proceeds to claim that rhetoric 
needs to determine the nature of the soul (dei dielesthai phusin … psuches; 270b4-5), since 
rhetoric is analogous to medicine; but whereas medicine treats of the body, rhetoric treats of 
the soul (270b1-2).51 This means that, if one as a rhetorician intends to install lawful pursuits 
and virtue in someone else, and to do so skillfully rather than on the basis of a knack and 
experience, one will need to know what soul is, just as a doctor, in order to produce health 
skillfully, needs to know the nature of the body (270a4-9). 
 It could therefore appear that Socrates is changing the direction of his discussion 
of rhetoric, from the claim that antilogikê must be based on knowledge concerning essences to 
the claim that it must be grounded in knowledge of the nature of the soul. We need not see 
this as a new, separate argument, however, but may regard it as complementary; rhetoric, 
conceived as antilogikê, must, in order to become a real skill, be based on knowledge 
 
50 I take for granted without argument that Socrates’ praise of Pericles and Anaxagoras is 
ironical. 
51 This view of rhetoric probably has a basis in historical fact; Gorgias thus likens the power of 
words to magic rituals in his Encomium of Helen, 8-10; see also Theaetetus 167a5-d2. 
 32 
concerning both the matters it treats of and the nature of the soul, since the soul is what it 
aims at influencing. Moreover, even while the nature of the soul is at the center of Socrates’ 
final argument concerning the basis for antilogikê, the discussion concerning the way one 
acquires knowledge of its nature is presented in general terms and concerns any matter that 
we may wish to inquire into, as is made explicit at both 270c10-d1 (peri hotououn phuseôs) 
and 271b7-c1 (oute ti allo oute touto). Emphasizing this point does not amount to denying 
that the soul has a very prominent place in the overall argument of the Phaedrus, concerned 
as it is with self-knowledge, eros, and the leading of souls; but it does amount to claiming that 
we are allowed to use Socrates’ description of the inquiry into the nature of the soul as a basis 
for understanding dialectical inquiry in general.52 
 Socrates begins his argument concerning the requirements that must be met in 
order to obtain knowledge of the soul by posing the following question: 
 
Then do you think it is possible to understand the nature of soul satisfactorily without 
understanding the nature of the whole? (270c1-2)53 
 
The expression “the nature of the whole” (tês tou holou phuseôs) may give one the impression 
that Socrates is suggesting that one needs to know the totality of the things that are (to pan) in 
order to determine the nature of the soul adequately. But this is not the case. When Phaedrus 
suggests that Hippocrates is of the same opinion when it comes to understanding the body 
(270c3-5),54 Socrates suggests that they should look both at what Hippocrates and at what the 
true account say about nature (270c9-10) and proceeds to state the following:  
 
Shouldn’t one reflect about the nature of anything like this: first, is the thing about which 
we will want to be experts ourselves and be capable of making other experts simple or 
complex? (270c10-d3).55  
 
52 For this reason, I for the present purpose leave aside Socrates’ claims about the required 
knowledge of different kinds of speeches and souls. 
53 ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἴει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως;   
54 Here the expression probably means the whole of nature, but see the discussion in De Vries, 
Commentary, note ad loc. 
55 ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὁτουοῦν φύσεως: πρῶτον μέν, ἁπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδές ἐστιν 
οὗ πέρι βουλησόμεθα εἶναι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν . . . 
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This suggests that Socrates by the expression “the nature of the whole” means “the nature of 
wholeness” rather than “the nature of all there is”.56 For in order to decide whether something 
is simple or complex, one has to understand what that something is as a whole, not what the 
whole of reality is. Socrates then proceeds to state the following: 
 
Next, if it is simple, we should consider, shouldn’t we, what natural power it has for 
acting and on what, or what power it has for being acted upon, and by what; and if it has 
more forms than one, we should count these, and see in the case of each, as in the case 
where it had only one, with which of them it is its nature to do what, or with which to 
have what done to it by what (270d3-7)57 
 
As can be seen from the whole passage 270c9-d8, Socrates spells out two distinct tasks that 
must be carried out in order to determine the nature of something. First, one needs to decide 
what that something is as a whole, and this requires deciding whether that something is 
simple or complex and, if complex, determining exactly how many parts it has. Next, one 
needs to decide what power to act and to be acted upon the thing possesses, either the whole 
thing itself or its constitutive parts. That these are indeed two consecutive tasks is 
emphasized when Socrates proceeds to spell out how one should determine the nature of the 
soul – as proton at 271a5 and deuteron at 271a10 make clear. These two tasks are what is 
required in order to indicate “precisely the essential nature (tên ousian … tês phuseôs)” of the 
soul (270d9-e5) or, indeed, of any other matter (271b7-c1). 
 The consequence of these claims for our general question concerning collection 
and division is this: the first task described by Socrates – deciding whether a thing is simple or 
complex – seems to be what collection and division are intended to help one perform, even if 
the procedures do not on their own ensure that this task is performed adequately, as the 
analysis of Socrates’ speeches made clear. Socrates used collection and division both in 
determining what eros is and in determining the nature of the soul, as we have seen, but the 
 
56 This view is defended convincingly by Hackforth, Phaedrus, 150, and De Vries, Commentary.  
57 ἔπειτα δέ, ἂν μὲν ἁπλοῦν ᾖ, σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν 
ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ, ἐὰν δὲ πλείω εἴδη ἔχῃ, ταῦτα ἀριθμησάμενον, ὅπερ ἐφ᾽ 
ἑνός, τοῦτ᾽ ἰδεῖν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου, τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ; 
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determination of eros and the soul found in the first speech were made questionable and 
rejected through the assumptions concerning madness and the nature of the soul in the 
second speech.58 It now turns out that the use of collection and division within philosophical 
inquiry is limited not only in the sense that it depends on some kind of prior understanding of 
the subject to which they are applied. For it seems clear that Socrates is not suggesting that 
the attempt to decide what power the thing inquired into possesses can be decided upon 
through the use of collection and division. Deciding what power the thing inquired into 
possesses rather seems to be a separate task, to be undertaken after collection and division 
have been employed. We may suggest that the attempt to decide what power a thing or its 
constitutive parts possess is a way of testing whether the collections and divisions performed 
on something have been carried out correctly. In the second speech, where Socrates stipulates 
four kinds of divine madness (244a5-245c5) in the attempt to show that eros has as share in 
the good kind of madness, he is in turn led to stipulate three parts of the soul (246a6-b6). On 
this basis he then proceeds in the remainder of the speech to give a highly complex account of 
the way these three parts interact with one another and act on and react to their respective 
objects, and this is what finally enables him to give an account of the power of eros. This 
suggests that the account of the powers the various parts of the soul possess is meant to 
support the suggested division of the soul and of divine madness, rather than being the result 
of these divisions. 
 If these observations are to the point, it follows that, while collection and division 
may be necessary for arriving at essential definitions, they are not sufficient. We may 
conclude that the commonly accepted claim that collection and division are introduced as a 
new method for arriving at essential definitions is wrong for the simple reason that they are 
unable to provide essential definitions on their own. As Socrates describes collection and 
 
58 That collection and division are applied to the soul as well as to madness in the two 
speeches is clear from 237d6-9 and, especially, 246a3-4 with 253c7-d1. It should be noted 
that division here divides the soul into parts or aspects (described as a black and white horse 
and a charioteer in the second speech), and not souls into sub-kinds of souls. Socrates does 
proceed to describe different kinds of souls in the second speech after having finished 
describing the three main ‘parts’ at 253d1, just as he mentions a third task to be carried out 
by the rhetorician at 271b1-5, namely to arrange or classify (diatassein) the kinds (genê) of 
souls and speeches; whether or not collection and division is meant to help us make this kind 
of classification is a question I will not enter into here.   
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division in the Phaedrus, he makes clear that it is only in combination with other 
considerations and insights that they may help us at arriving at such definitions. It is this 
complex combination, I suggest, that Socrates calls the “ability to look to one and over what 
are naturally many”.  
 Moreover, if it is correct that the aim of collection and division is to help us 
understand the connection between complex wholes and their parts, these procedures are not 
intended to help us in “the mapping of reality”, a task of dialectic that many commentators see 
as specific to the later Plato, 59 – or at least this is not the only or the primary aim of collection 
and division. Rather, collection and division are intended to help us in addressing a problem 
that stands at the center of dialogues such as the Gorgias, the Protagoras and the Republic, 
namely how something that is one – for instance the soul, knowledge, or virtue – can also be 
many, in the sense that it contains different parts or aspects. Socrates’ claim that he has up 
until now called those able to look to one and over what are naturally many dialectical 
(266b7-c1) may therefore be understood to suggest that Plato’s Socrates in general uses the 
word ‘dialectical’ to designate people who are able to see a complex matter correctly, 
understanding both this matter as a whole and in regard to its various parts or aspects. 
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